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ESSAYS
THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CANON
*

STEPHEN I. VLADECK

Why have victims of post-September 11 governmental misconduct met with virtually
no success thus far in pursuing damages claims arising out of the government’s
alleged abuses? One explanation is that these cases are nothing more than one piece of
a larger puzzle in which fewer and fewer civil plaintiffs have been able to recover in
any suit alleging official misconduct. After all, it is a familiar trope that the Supreme
Court has shown increasing skepticism in recent years toward civil plaintiffs in
damages suits against government officers. Complicating matters, because reasonable
minds continue to disagree about the legality of the surveillance, detention, and
treatment of terrorism suspects (and a host of other controversial measures) since
September 11, different perspectives on the underlying legal questions will necessarily
color our view of whether the absence of relief in these cases is a new—or troubling—
development.
In this Essay, I aim to provide a deeper answer to this question by looking carefully
at the evolution of four different general doctrines in federal courts jurisprudence that
have figured prominently in national security civil suits over the past decade: the
availability of Bivens remedies; federal common law defenses to state-law suits against
government contractors; qualified immunity; and the political question doctrine. To
determine whether the lack of recovery in post-September 11 civil litigation differs in
kind or merely degree from that which is true more generally, I contrast the state of
these doctrines in non-national security cases with how the same law has been applied
in suits with national security over- or under-tones. As I conclude, closer inspection
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and perseverance.
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reveals fairly compelling evidence for the emergence of a new “national security
canon,” a body of rules unique to national security cases that, at least thus far, all cut
against allowing relief in suits that might otherwise be able to proceed to judgment.
Absent a change in direction, this trend will have two sets of consequences: First,
national security policy will, in most cases, increasingly come to be an area over which
the political branches exercise near-plenary control (thereby perpetuating, whether
correctly or not, the argument that courts lack the institutional competence to resolve
such claims). Second, as such, we may well come to understand the emergence of the
national security canon over the past decade as another example of the “normalization
of the exception”—the accommodation into existing law of practices and policies
typically embraced only by virtue of their exigency and fleeting duration. As the
national security canon becomes more deeply ingrained, so too the likelihood that it
will expand into contexts other than those in which it has thus far been recognized.
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INTRODUCTION
As of May 2012, not a single damages judgment has been awarded
in any of the dozens of lawsuits arising out of post-September 11 U.S.
counterterrorism policies alleging violations of plaintiffs’ individual
1
rights. For some, this result simply testifies to the thoughtfulness
and care with which the government has conducted the “war on
terrorism”; it follows that there is no need for damages if no rights

1. Obviously, this figure does not take into account suits in which settlements
were reached—a set that is certainly not empty. Nor does it include pending cases
where the current posture supports recovery for the plaintiff. Rather, the question is
simply whether any court has awarded damages in a challenge to a post-September
11 counterterrorism or other national security initiative. So far, the answer has been
no. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2009)
(describing how no torture cases against the United States have moved past summary
judgment).
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2

have actually been violated. For others, this outcome is a function
less of the legality of the government’s conduct than the novelty of the
measures adopted after September 11—and the corresponding idea
that, whether or not the government crossed the line, the law was not
“clearly established” such that individual officers should be held
3
liable for whatever transgressions may have occurred. Still, others
take a more cynical view, seeing in this body of jurisprudence a
systematic effort to create a form of functional impunity—a creation
of new doctrinal barriers to relief that deny recovery even where
4
extant precedent would otherwise appear to have supported it.
Assessing who has the better of this argument is a difficult
endeavor. For starters, it is now a familiar trope that the Supreme
Court has shown increasing hostility toward civil plaintiffs in most
damages suits against government officers—and not just those
5
implicating national security policies. Whatever fealty the Warren
and early Burger Courts may have demonstrated toward suits
challenging official action, it can hardly be gainsaid that the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have systematically made it more
difficult for civil plaintiffs to obtain damages in cases arising out of
6
governmental misconduct. In that vein, the absence of meritorious
damages claims arising out of counterterrorism initiatives may merely
be part of a larger pattern in which fewer and fewer civil plaintiffs
2. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663–67 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting a Bivens
claim for damages brought by a former Guantanamo detainee after finding that he
had qualified immunity), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), reinstated on remand, 563 F.3d
527 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083–84 (2011) (concluding that
in order for a government officer to be liable in damages actions, his conduct must
have violated “clearly established” law of which a reasonable officer in his position
knew or should have known).
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Wilson, “Damages or Nothing”: The Post-Boumediene
Constitution and Compensation for Human Rights Violations After 9/11, 41 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1491, 1492–93 (2011) (describing how the outcomes of many post-Boumediene
cases have been determined solely by the impact of immigration law and not with
reference to actual culpability).
5. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an
Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1106–07
(2006) (asserting that the current Court has a particular disdain for litigation and
has “tightened the conditions under which successful litigants can recover damages
or attorney’s fees” in suits against the government); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 356–62 (identifying a similar
pattern); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 224 (2003) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was
unwilling to create remedies without explicit congressional permission).
6. See Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government From
Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333, 1384 (2010)
(reviewing the Roberts Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence and concluding that the current
Court is likely to be hostile to litigants seeking liberalized remedies for victims of
governmental wrongdoing).
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have been able to recover in any suit alleging official misconduct.
In addition, there is no consensus as to the underlying legality—or
lack thereof—of much of the challenged governmental conduct in
8
national security cases. So long as reasonable minds continue to
disagree about the legality of the surveillance, detention, and
treatment of terrorism suspects (and a host of other controversial
measures) since September 11, it can hardly be surprising that
different perspectives on the underlying legal questions will
necessarily color our view of whether the absence of relief in these
9
cases is a new—or troubling—development.
Whereas most of this debate has been couched in terms of
generalizations, I aim in this Essay to illuminate the conversation with
specifics—to look carefully at the evolution of four different general
doctrines in federal courts jurisprudence that have figured
prominently in national security civil suits over the past decade: the
availability of Bivens remedies; federal common law defenses to statelaw suits against government contractors; qualified immunity; and the
10
political question doctrine.
To determine whether the lack of
7. Indeed, such reasoning extends to the Court’s aggressive reinvigoration of
state sovereign immunity, its reluctance to recognize implied statutory causes of
action, its narrowing of the scope of federal rights that can be enforced via 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and so on. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 224 (arguing that the current Court
has been unwilling to grant damages to civil plaintiffs in actions against the
government absent an explicit congressional mandate).
8. To take just one example, there appears to still be disagreement about
whether the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere was in fact illegal. See,
e.g., Arthur S. Brisbane, The Other Torture Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK8
(illustrating that many believed the interrogation methods used post-September 11
at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere did not amount to torture).
9. For a thoughtful take on the role of “hindsight bias” in these cases, see
generally Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National
Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010), discussing
“hindsight bias” in the context of encouraging officials’ innovation through flexible
approaches to damages claims.
10. This list will strike some as arbitrary. After all, one could easily also include
the availability of Article III standing in suits challenging national security policies,
see, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding
that petitioner does have Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978), petition for
cert. filed, No. 11-1025 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2012), pleading requirements under Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 665 (2009)
(considering whether the Respondent’s complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to
state claim as required under Rule 8), or the state secrets privilege, see, e.g.,
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(holding that the state secrets doctrine required the plaintiffs’ challenge to the
defendant’s role in their extraordinary rendition be dismissed), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2442 (2011). With regard to the first two, however, I do not believe there are clear
examples of contemporary cases adopting “new” rules in national security cases. And
with regard to the state secrets privilege, leaving aside the general oversaturation of
quality scholarship the topic has already received, two full-length articles, in
particular, have considered in detail whether post-September 11 developments have
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recovery in post-September 11 civil litigation differs in kind or merely
degree from that which is true more generally, I contrast the state of
these doctrines in non-national security cases with how the same law
11
has been applied in suits with national security over- or under-tones.
To that end, Part I situates the analysis by providing a capsule
summary of the state of the canon with respect to each of these
doctrines on September 10, 2001. In Part II, I turn to the key
doctrinal developments since September 11 in each field. As Part II
will establish, careful study of the relevant jurisprudence yields three
significant, but not necessarily consistent, conclusions: First, in each
of these four areas, there have been cases in which courts have
recognized newfound “national security”-based reasons to foreclose
recovery by plaintiffs. Second, some of the most profound obstacles to
recovery have been articulated on more general terms, such that
their application is not necessarily confined to challenges to
counterterrorism policies. Third, virtually all of the national securityspecific rules have been articulated by lower courts, with little more
than tacit endorsement by the Supreme Court. In contrast, the Court
has played a more direct role in identifying some of the more crosscutting obstacles to recovery. Thus, although the emergence of a
new national security canon has primarily been a project of the lower
courts, the Supreme Court’s more general constriction of civil
remedies against government officers may well have emboldened,
however indirectly, particularly aggressive doctrinal innovation at the
circuit level. At the same time, the Court has steadfastly refused to
address virtually any of the national security-specific doctrinal
12
developments, however presented.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I turn to the normative implications of
the trends identified in Part II. Although I suspect readers will react

been qualitatively different. Compare Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 87 (2010) (focusing attention on federal court cases between
2001 and 2009), with Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2007) (using a survey of the origin and
evolution of the state secrets doctrine to suggest that the Bush Administration did
not differ qualitatively in its use of the privilege).
11. In that regard, this Essay builds off a shorter, earlier piece I wrote focusing
specifically on the proliferation of amorphous “national security” concerns in Bivens
litigation. See Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 255, 257–58 (2010) (suggesting that Bivens remedies can, and should,
play a meaningful role in national security cases because Bivens likely provides the
sole means of redress for constitutional violations).
12. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 122 (2011) (examining the Supreme Court’s docket in post-September 11
terrorism cases—and reflecting on the consequences of the Court’s passive-aggressive
behavior).
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differently to the emergence of the new national security canon that
Part II identifies, I anticipate two specific effects going forward: First,
absent a change in direction, national security policy will, in most
cases, increasingly come to be an area over which the political
branches exercise near-plenary control (thereby perpetuating,
whether correctly or not, the argument that courts lack the
institutional competence to resolve such claims). Second, as such, we
may well come to understand the emergence of the national security
canon over the past decade as another example of the “normalization
of the exception”—the accommodation into existing law of practices
and policies typically embraced only by virtue of their exigency and
13
fleeting duration.
I.

THE FEDERAL COURTS CANON ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2001
A. Bivens Remedies

The doctrinal evolution of Bivens remedies has been well- and
14
often-traced. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics was a 1971 decision in which the Supreme Court for the
first time recognized that, in certain circumstances, the Constitution
itself provides a cause of action for damages for constitutional
15
violations by federal officers. Thus, in Bivens, the Court recognized
a damages claim arising out of an alleged Fourth Amendment
violation, holding that such remedies should be available unless: (1)
16
Congress had displaced them with a comprehensive alternative; or
17
(2) “special factors counseling hesitation” militated against relief.
In that regard, Bivens filled a critical remedial gap, since no federal
statute provided a general cause of action for obtaining damages for
18
constitutional violations by federal—as opposed to state—officers.
13. See, e.g., OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 236 (2006) (arguing that the
normalization phenomenon can cause the state to accept controversial emergency
powers); cf. Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. SOC. 455, 457–58 (1941)
(suggesting that such normalization is inevitable in the modern industrial state).
14. For one of the most comprehensive (and recent) examples, see James E.
Pfander, The Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 295–96 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik
eds., 2010), observing that the Court’s “unsteady” path in Bivens litigation has created
substantial uncertainty about what Bivens litigants must prove to prevail.
15. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390 (1971).
16. Id. at 397.
17. Id. at 396–97.
18. At the time, the FTCA did not authorize suits arising out of intentional torts
or claims not recognized as torts in the law of the state in which they accrued. See
generally James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
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Indeed, notwithstanding intervening amendments to the Federal
19
20
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), there remains no such statute today.
Although Bivens was somewhat controversial, the Court’s first two
21
Thus, in Davis v.
follow-up decisions only expanded its scope.
22
Passman, the Court extended Bivens to encompass a claim for sexbased discrimination in violation of the equal protection principles
23
enmeshed within the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And
24
in Carlson v. Green, the Court allowed a Bivens claim to proceed
against a prison warden based on the claim that the warden had
denied an inmate access to timely medical care in violation of the
25
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.
Although the government argued in Green that the FTCA displaced
26
Bivens in that case, Justice Brennan explained that Congress can
only oust Bivens if it “provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
27
Constitution and viewed as equally effective,” which Congress had
28
not so declared in the case of the FTCA.
In retrospect, Green was the high-water mark for Bivens remedies.
In the 32 years since, the Court has not only declined to recognize
any other constitutional provisions that can be enforced via Bivens, but
it has shown an unwillingness to apply the three pro-Bivens decisions
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121 (2009) (providing an overview of the
history of legislative developments in the wake of Bivens).
19. In 1974, Congress amended the intentional tort exception to the FTCA to
create liability for certain intentional torts for law enforcement officers. See Pub. L.
No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)).
And in 1988, Congress in the Westfall Act created a comprehensive scheme for
substituting the federal government in virtually all state-law tort suits against federal
officers arising out of the scope of their employment. See Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102
Stat. 4563, 4564 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2006)). As Jim Pfander and David
Baltmanis have argued, these statutes, the legislative history of both of which
positively discussed Bivens, could be seen as providing at least congressional
acquiescence in the Supreme Court’s decision. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 18,
at 131–34.
20. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233–36 (1994) (arguing that states should adopt “converse1983” statutes, which would create a state-law cause of action for violations of federal
constitutional rights by federal officers).
21. See Pfander, supra note 14, at 295–96 (recounting the Court’s initial
expansion of Bivens to encompass damages for Equal Protection Clause and Eighth
Amendment violations).
22. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
23. Id. at 230–31.
24. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
25. Id. at 16–18.
26. Id. at 17–18.
27. Id. at 18–19.
28. Id. at 19–20 (emphasis added).
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29

to even the most minutely different facts.
The retrenchment took place simultaneously along two axes—the
two exceptions Justice Brennan identified in Bivens itself. Thus, in a
series of cases beginning in the 1980s, the Court held that various
federal statutory schemes displaced Bivens relief, even though none
of those schemes satisfied the requirement from Green that Congress
have “explicitly declared [the relevant scheme] to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
30
31
effective.”
Thus, Bush v. Lucas refused to recognize a First
Amendment retaliation claim arising out of the civil service, based on
the existence of an internal administrative process under the Civil
Service Reform Act in which the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were
32
33
“fully cognizable.” And the Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky rejected
Bivens relief in a claim alleging a due process violation in the
processing of federal Social Security benefits, deferring to the
complex scheme of administrative and judicial remedies provided by
34
the Social Security Act. Whether or not Congress in these cases had
intended to displace Bivens, the decisions at least rested on the
(however dubious) premise that Congress had indeed so provided.
Moreover, “[t]o the extent that the logic of Bivens turned on the
possibility that it was ‘damages or nothing,’ that concern was not as
strongly implicated in cases where federal law did not force that
35
choice.”
The far more significant retrenchment of Bivens, though, took
place through the other exception Justice Brennan identified—the
existence of “special factors counseling hesitation” before courts
36
should recognize a self-executing constitutional damages remedy.
At first, the Court’s “special factors” jurisprudence focused on claims
29. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (explaining the
Court’s consistent refusal to extend Bivens liability to new contexts or new categories
of defendants); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (declining to extend Bivens
remedies to First Amendment violations in the context of federal employment
because of the existence of alternative federal remedies).
30. Green, 446 U.S. at 19–20 (emphasis added).
31. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
32. Id. at 385–86.
33. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
34. Id. at 419–20.
35. Vladeck, supra note 11, at 264.
36. In Bivens itself, Justice Brennan gave only two examples: United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 316 (1947), in which the U.S. government was the
plaintiff (and therefore could have created the liability it sought to enforce), and
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963), in which an employee of Congress was
sued for allegedly exceeding his delegated authority—hardly a constitutional claim.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396–97 (1971).
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arising out of the military. Thus, in Chappell v. Wallace, handed
down the same day as Bush v. Lucas, the Court focused on the unique
nature of the military’s internal system of discipline as a “special
factor” counseling against the recognition of a Bivens claim by
enlisted personnel against their superior officers alleging racial
discrimination (notwithstanding the application of Bivens to equal
38
protection claims in Davis v. Passman). Four years later, the Court
39
in United States v. Stanley concluded that there were “special factors”
weighing against a Bivens remedy for an action brought by a
serviceman claiming that he was secretly subjected to LSD as part of
an Army experiment:
The “special facto[r]” that “counsel[s] hesitation” is . . . the fact
that congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the
judiciary is inappropriate . . . . We hold that no Bivens remedy is
available for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of
40
activity incident to service.”

As I have suggested before, both Chappell and Stanley “concerned
the hyper-specific issue of civil lawsuits arising out of military service,
an area in which the courts had a record of according substantial
deference to the political branches that pre-dated Bivens by
41
decades.” Thus, as with Bush and Schweiker, these early decisions
could be seen as relatively narrow carve-outs to an otherwise vibrant
doctrine.
But the Court’s next two Bivens decisions sent quite the opposite
42
message. In FDIC v. Meyer, the Court declined to recognize a Bivens
remedy based on a due process claim against the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, holding that “special factors” generally
43
counseled against Bivens remedies against federal agencies.
As
Justice Thomas explained, “[i]f we were to recognize a direct action
for damages against federal agencies, we would be creating a
potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal
44
45
Government.”
Similarly, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,
decided just two months after the September 11 attacks, the Court
37. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
38. Id. at 304.
39. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
40. Id. at 683–84 (alterations in original) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
41. Vladeck, supra note 11, at 264.
42. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
43. See id. at 485–86 (specifying that the damages remedies applied under Bivens
would inappropriately affect federal fiscal policy if awarded against federal agencies).
44. Id. at 486.
45. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
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refused to extend Bivens to a suit against the private operators of a
federal halfway house, even though the underlying claim closely
46
Without
mirrored that which the Court had approved in Green.
specifically explaining why “special factors” counseled hesitation,
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Bivens relief should only be
recognized “to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action
against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or
to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative
remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional
47
conduct.”
Indeed, although it was decided shortly after September 11,
Malesko helps drive home the state of Bivens jurisprudence at the
outset of the war on terrorism: The Court had shown increasing
skepticism toward recognizing “new” Bivens claims primarily by
relying on the idea of “special factors”; but at the same time, the
Court had never rejected Bivens relief when such a claim was the only
means by which the plaintiff could vindicate a constitutional claim
48
against a federal officer. Despite the objections of Justices Scalia
49
and Thomas to the entire Bivens enterprise, the Court had quite
carefully left open the possibility that, in a case where the choice was
50
truly between “Bivens or nothing,” the Justices might choose the
former.
B. Contractor Preemption
Unlike Bivens, where significant pre-September 11 case law helped
to illuminate the trend in the Supreme Court’s approach, only one
46. Id. at 63.
47. Id. at 70.
48. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (permitting Bivens
remedies for persons injured by federal officers’ Eighth Amendment violations given
the absence of alternative remedies); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409–10 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”). See generally
Carlos Manuel Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law and the Nature of the Bivens
Question,
161
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038641.
49. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of
action . . . . As the Court points out, we have abandoned that power to invent
‘implications’ in the statutory field. There is even greater reason to abandon it in the
constitutional field, since an ‘implication’ imagined in the Constitution can
presumably not even be repudiated by Congress.”). For a critique of Justice Scalia’s
analogy to the Court’s implied statutory remedy jurisprudence, see Stephen I.
Vladeck, Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the “Heady Days,” 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 514
(2012).
50. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 18, at 123 (contending that when Bivens
claims are denied, most plaintiffs are unable to pursue state-law theories).
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decision by the Supreme Court prior to 2001 specifically spoke to the
question of “contractor preemption,” i.e., cases in which the federal
government’s interests justified judicial recognition of a federal
common law rule barring state-law claims against government
51
contractors. That (controversial) case was the Court’s 1988 decision
52
in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.
53
Boyle arose out of the crash of a military helicopter. The heirs of
one of the decedents brought a state-law wrongful death action
against the contractor responsible for designing the helicopter,
alleging that a design flaw in the escape hatch prevented the
decedent (who had survived the initial crash into the Atlantic Ocean)
54
from escaping before he drowned.
Writing for a 5-4 Court, Justice Scalia held that such a state-law
55
claim was “displaced” by federal common law. At the outset, he
emphasized case law holding that “obligations to and rights of the
United States under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal
56
law,” as is “the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in
57
the course of their duty.” Although Boyle involved a government
contractor and not a federal employee, the Court still noted that in
both instances the government’s interest in having the work
58
completed remains constant.
Thus, Justice Scalia explained that
imposing liability on government contractors would be adverse to the
interests of the United States because government contractors would
respond by either: (1) raising procurement prices or (2) declining to
59
follow design specifications.

51. To be sure, there are other contexts in which federal interests have been held
to justify the displacement via federal common law of state-law remedies, including
cases in which the relevant considerations sounded in foreign policy. See, e.g., Am.
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397 (2003) (holding that a California statute
requiring disclosure of certain World War II insurance policy information was
preempted by foreign policy considerations). But Boyle and its progeny bespeak a
unique form of preemption, as articulated below. See infra notes 53–65 and
accompanying text.
52. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
53. Id. at 502.
54. See id. at 502–04 (summarizing the case’s background).
55. Indeed, the Court consciously appeared to distinguish in Boyle between
“displacement” and “preemption” of state law. The latter occurs when positive
federal law ousts state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause; the former occurs when
federal common law is the culprit. See, e.g., id. at 507–08 n.3 (noting explicitly that
the Court is referring to the displacement of state law and not preemption); cf. Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534–35 (2011) (referring to the
statutory “displacement” of federal common law).
56. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
57. Id. at 505.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 507.
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That federal interests were triggered, though, was not the end of
the inquiry. Instead, Justice Scalia then explained that such interests
justify the displacement of state law only when “a ‘significant conflict’
exists between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the
[operation] of state law,’ or the application of state law would
60
As he
‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”
concluded, “[t]he conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as
that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when Congress
legislates ‘in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.’ . . .
61
But conflict there must be.”
Turning to the case at hand, Justice Scalia found the existence of
precisely such a conflict, since the government contract imposed on
the contractor a duty to install the escape hatch pursuant to the
government’s specifications while the plaintiff claimed the contractor
had a conflicting duty to deviate from those specifications by
62
including other escape hatch mechanisms. In other words, in an
area of such strong federal concern, state-law claims should not be
allowed to go forward when they present such a square conflict with
63
existing (and presumptively valid) federal policy choices. This was
especially so, Justice Scalia reasoned, because of the FTCA, which
specifically exempts from suit claims arising out of a government
64
officer’s performance of a “discretionary function.” Because “[w]e
think that the selection of the appropriate design for military
equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a
discretionary function within the meaning of this provision,” it was
that much clearer that the strong federal interest not only counseled
65
against state-law claims, but against any liability whatsoever.
The Supreme Court has not reconsidered (or extended) Boyle since
it was decided. At least before September 11, however, lower courts
had primarily understood Boyle as nothing more than an extension of
the FTCA’s “discretionary function” exception to a particular type of
state-law tort suits against contractors, whether because it was a
“derivative immunity” or a form of “federal common law
preemption.” In 2000, for example, the Fifth Circuit cited Boyle for
the proposition that “[g]overnment contractor immunity is derived
from the government’s immunity from suit where the performance of

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 507–08 (citations omitted).
Id. at 509.
See id. at 509–10.
Id. at 500–01.
Id. at 511.
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a discretionary function is at issue.” And in an earlier case, the
Seventh Circuit described Boyle as holding that, “under certain
circumstances, government contractors are shielded from state tort
liability [only] for products manufactured for the Armed Forces of
67
the United States.”
Indeed, pre-September 11 cases relying on Boyle invariably involved
relatively minor variations on the underlying theme: plaintiffs
seeking to use state law to recover against contractors for claims that
would have been barred under the discretionary function exception
if brought directly against the responsible government officers.
68
Virtually all of these suits arose in the products liability context.
C. The Political Question Doctrine
Whereas Bivens and Boyle both go to the availability vel non of a
cause of action arising out of governmental (or government
contractor) misconduct, there are also a number of defenses in suits
69
challenging official action, including the political question doctrine.
70
Although it has its origins in Marbury v. Madison, in contemporary
terms, the political question doctrine is shorthand for the recognition
that there are some disputes ill-suited for judicial resolution, either
because the Constitution commits their resolution to other branches
71
or because the claims lack “judicially manageable standards.”
Despite the amount of attention the doctrine receives and its
prominence in the lower courts, “[t]he political question doctrine
has occupied a more limited place in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence than is sometimes assumed,” as Judge Kavanaugh of
66. Kerstetter v. Pac. Scientific Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2000).
67. Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996).
68. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained Boyle as standing for the proposition that,
“[w]here the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the
subject of the claim, we have recognized this as a special circumstance where the
contractor may assert a defense.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6
(2001).
69. As noted above, I do not consider the state secrets privilege in this Essay.
Supra note 10 (noting the parameters of this Essay as well as providing helpful
citations to more complete discussions of the state secrets privilege before and after
September 11).
70. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803) (“Where the head of a department acts
in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere
organ of executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control,
in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.”).
71. These are two of the six factors articulated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962). Over time, they have come to be seen as the two dominant considerations.
See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 856 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that, over the
past fifty years, the Court has exclusively relied on these two Baker factors in applying
the political question doctrine), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
72
Indeed, only twice in the past halfCircuit recently explained.
century has the Court relied on the existence of a “textually
demonstrable commitment” to another branch to dismiss a case on
73
political question grounds, and the cases involving the absence of
“judicially manageable standards” have all fallen within the same
74
subject-matter: challenges to “partisan” gerrymandering.
75
Thus, in Nixon v. United States, decided in 1993, the Court threw
out a suit by former federal judge Walter Nixon seeking to contest
76
After being
the means by which he was removed from office.
impeached by the House of Representatives, Nixon was tried before a
special Senate committee, which was empowered to “receive evidence
and take testimony” before reporting back to the full body, which
then proceeded to reach a verdict pursuant to the constitutionally
77
prescribed procedure. Nixon claimed that the proceedings before
the committee were inconsistent with the constitutional requirement
that he be tried by the Senate because the full Senate was barred
78
from participating in the evidentiary hearings. For a unanimous
79
Court (although some Justices offered different rationales), Chief
Justice Rehnquist held Nixon’s claims to be barred by the political
80
question doctrine.
According to Rehnquist, the text of the
Constitution (which invests the Senate with the “sole” power to “try”

72. El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 856 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993) (concluding that
exclusive power to adjudicate the merits of impeachment proceedings against federal
judges is textually committed to the Senate by virtue of Art. I, § 3, cl. 6); Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (explaining that surveillance over the weaponry,
training, and standing orders of the National Guard are responsibilities vested
exclusively in the executive and legislative branches).
74. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 416
(2006) (plurality opinion) (lamenting that drawing congressional lines is an
unwelcome task for the judiciary because of the difficulties in drawing a “fair and
rational” map); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(dismissing a gerrymandering challenge to Pennsylvania’s legislative districts due to a
lack of judicially manageable standards).
75. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
76. Id. at 228.
77. Id. at 226–28.
78. Id. at 228.
79. Justices White and Souter each wrote separate opinions concurring only in
the judgment. See id. at 239–40 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning
that the Court did have jurisdiction to ensure that the Senate “tried” impeached
officials, but that the Senate had met that standard in the instant case); id. at 252–54
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that judicial interference in
Senate impeachment trials would lead to impermissible consequences, but
suggesting that review might nevertheless be available in cases of egregious
misconduct by the Senate).
80. Id. at 237–38 (majority opinion).
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81

cases of impeachment) categorically precluded judicial second82
guessing of the means by which such a trial was conducted.
As for cases raising a lack of judicially manageable standards, a
good (albeit post-September 11) example is the Court’s 2004
83
decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer.
There, voters challenged the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s redistricting plan following the
2000 census, arguing that, because of the Pennsylvania legislature’s
partisan gerrymandering, the new district maps violated the “one
84
85
person, one vote” rule of Reynolds v. Sims. In 1986, the Supreme
86
Court had concluded in Davis v. Bandemer that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered federal judges to
87
circumscribe partisan gerrymandering.
Writing for a four-Justice
plurality in Vieth, however, Justice Scalia emphasized the extent to
which no remotely manageable standard had emerged in the
eighteen intervening years that could draw the line between “good
88
politics and bad politics.” Put more bluntly, no one had been able
to articulate a sufficiently clear set of standards to explain whether—
and to what extent—district lines drawn for one political party’s
partisan advantage would violate Article I, Article IV, or the Equal
Protection Clause.
The political significance of the decision aside, the critical point
about Vieth for present purposes is the extent to which that prong of
the political question doctrine has only surfaced in contemporary
disputes along similar lines. In ascertaining the scope of the political
question doctrine in national security cases after September 11, it is
89
the first of the Baker v. Carr factors, and not the second, that will
prove critical.
D. Qualified Immunity
Finally, perhaps the most commonly invoked defense in suits
challenging official action is officer immunity. Although some
81. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall
preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of
the Members present.”).
82. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 234–35.
83. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
84. See id. at 290 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the “one person, one vote”
rule provided judicially manageable standards with which to resolve the dispute).
85. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
86. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
87. Id. at 143.
88. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 299 (plurality opinion).
89. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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officers are entitled to “absolute immunity” when acting in particular
90
capacities, the doctrine of far more relevance here is “qualified
immunity,” which provides that “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
91
have known.”
In enunciating the current standard in Harlow v.
92
Fitzgerald in 1982, the Court famously disclaimed reliance upon
subjective considerations (such as malice or bad faith), opting instead
for an objective inquiry that could be resolved in most cases on the
93
pleadings, or at worst, at summary judgment.
The qualified immunity test itself has undergone only modest
94
revisions since Harlow. In Anderson v. Creighton, for example, the
Court clarified that:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing
95
law the unlawfulness must be apparent.

Thus, most of the doctrinal innovation with regard to qualified
immunity has centered not on whether the right of the plaintiff in
question was “clearly established,” but whether the unlawfulness of
96
the officer’s conduct was “apparent.” A subtle distinction in theory, it
97
has proved rather significant in practice.
Separate from the standard to apply in qualified immunity cases is
the means by which qualified immunity claims are resolved.
90. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501–05 (2012) (summarizing the
origins and scope of absolute immunity to § 1983 suits).
91. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
92. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
93. Thus, qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To that end,
the denial of a qualified immunity defense is subject to immediate interlocutory
appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 524–30.
94. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
95. Id. at 640.
96. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“This is not to say that an
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law
the unlawfulness must be apparent.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
97. See, e.g., Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 534–35 (4th Cir.) (en banc)
(rejecting officer’s argument that he was entitled to qualified immunity because it
was not clearly established that shooting a fleeing nonthreatening misdemeanant
would be unlawful under the circumstances), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 781 (2011).

VLADECK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CANON

6/14/2012 7:11 PM

1311

Typically, a qualified immunity defense presents two analytically
distinct questions: (1) whether the officer’s conduct was unlawful
(the “legality” question); and (2) whether the unlawfulness should
have been apparent in light of clearly established law (the “liability”
question). Although an officer cannot be liable unless his conduct
was also unlawful, the same is not true in reverse. As such, courts
might be tempted to assume, without deciding, that the conduct was
unlawful in cases in which the law was not yet clearly established,
98
since the defendant prevails regardless of the legality of his conduct.
Such an approach, however, would potentially thwart the
development of forward-looking law, since courts would not be
99
“establishing” any legal rules going forward.
To ward against that possibility, the Supreme Court in June 2001
mandated a particular “order-of-battle” in qualified immunity cases,
100
holding in Saucier v. Katz that lower courts should answer the
legality question first in all cases, including those in which the
101
defendant will nevertheless prevail on liability. As Justice Kennedy
explained for the majority:
This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case . . . .
The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply
to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established
that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the
102
case.

Thus, qualified immunity on the eve of September 11 had two
salient characteristics. First, under Anderson, the central question was
whether the unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct (and not the
plaintiff’s underlying right) was apparent in light of “clearly
established” law. Second, under the so-called “Saucier sequence,”
even in cases in which that standard could not be met, courts still had
a duty to answer the legality question—and to thereby articulate
forward-looking principles of constitutional law to govern future
cases, even if they were ultimately irrelevant to the disposition of the
case sub judice.

98. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)
(recounting that the District Court granted summary judgment on a qualified
immunity theory by assuming, without deciding, that a substantive due process
violation had taken place, but then holding that the law was not established with
sufficient clarity to justify § 1983 liability).
99. See id. (stating that an immunity determination alone would not create any
standards for future cases).
100. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
101. Id. at 206.
102. Id. at 201.
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II. THE FEDERAL COURTS CANON AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
It seems silly to ask whether the terrorist attacks of September 11
and the government’s various responses thereto have had an impact
on the federal courts. Quite obviously, much has changed over the
103
past eleven years.
But there is a critical difference in this context
between correlation and causation. Thus, in this Part, I revisit the
four doctrinal areas surveyed in Part I, and examine some of the
critical developments in each since September 11. As this Part will
demonstrate, some of the innovations of the past decade seem to
have very little to do with national security concerns, whereas others
are entirely a creature of such concerns.
A. Bivens Remedies
The Supreme Court has handed down two significant Bivens
104
105
decisions since September 11.
In the first, Wilkie v. Robbins, the
Court rejected a Bivens claim arising out of a series of run-ins between
a ranch owner and U.S. Bureau of Land Management officials over
106
an easement, which led to charges of harassment and retaliation.
The Court’s analysis identified “a special factor counseling hesitation
107
quite unlike any we have recognized before.” The Court harped on
the “difficulty” that would result from finding a new Bivens remedy to
redress Robbins’s individual and distinct injuries collectively, because
“a general provision for tort-like liability when Government
employees are unduly zealous in pressing a governmental interest
108
affecting property would invite an onslaught of Bivens actions.”
Although the special factor identified in Wilkie was new, the Court
again seized on the likelihood that each of Robbins’s individual
109
claims likely had an adequate remedy under federal or state law.
103. Indeed, this Essay has all but ignored the remarkable body of habeas corpus
jurisprudence precipitated by the detention of terrorism suspects since 2001. See
generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2011)
(book review) (surveying the impact of historical understandings of the Suspension
Clause on contemporary litigation).
104. Bivens has also been at issue in two additional cases. In Hartman v. Moore, 547
U.S. 250 (2006), the Court addressed the elements a plaintiff must plead in order to
make out a retaliatory prosecution Bivens claim without addressing the availability of
a Bivens remedy in any more detail. Id. at 251. And in Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct.
1845 (2010), the Court held that the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(a),
provides a statutory alternative to Bivens claims against Public Health Service
employees arising out of their official duties. 130 S. Ct. at 1853. Neither decision
broke new ground in Bivens jurisprudence.
105. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
106. Id. at 561–62.
107. Id. at 577 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 562 (majority opinion).
109. See id. (asserting that legislation would be better suited to remedy

VLADECK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 7:11 PM

THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY CANON

1313
110

Finally, just this Term, the Court in Minneci v. Pollard appeared to
come full-circle on Bivens, rejecting a claim against an individual
employee working for a private contractor operating a federal prison
on the ground that adequate remedies were almost certainly available
111
under state law.
Although the claim closely mirrored that which
the Court had approved in Green, the Court held that “Pollard’s
Eighth Amendment claim focuses upon a kind of conduct that
typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law. And in the
case of a privately employed defendant, state tort law provides an
‘alternative, existing process’ capable of protecting the constitutional
112
interests at stake.”
In both Wilkie and Pollard, then, the Court continued the trend of
declining to recognize “new” Bivens claims, albeit on fairly narrow
terms in each instance. Wilkie recognized a “new” “special factor” in
the form of the potential floodgates of recognizing a zealousness113
based property-rights Bivens claim; Pollard suggested that adequate
state-law remedies may by themselves be sufficient to displace
114
Bivens,
at least where the defendant is a private contractor
operating under color of state law, rather than a government officer.
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s cautious skepticism, three
different circuit courts have recognized a new obstacle to Bivens
claims in national security cases—a “special factor” based on the
sensitivity of the government’s national security policies. Properly
understood, such a “special factor” both (1) unduly incorporates
other doctrinal concerns into cause-of-action analysis and (2) would
therefore bar any and all recovery to the relevant plaintiffs, going a
critical step beyond anything the Supreme Court has ever sanctioned.
The first decision to reach this result was the D.C. Circuit’s holding
115
in Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II). Rasul II was a damages suit brought by
non-citizens formerly detained as “enemy combatants” at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, alleging a series of violations of their
statutory, constitutional, and treaty-based rights in their detention

government overreach than judicially created factors).
110. 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
111. See id. at 623–24 (stating that state tort law can be effective in preventing
constitutional violations).
112. Id. at 623. As Carlos Vázquez and I argue in a forthcoming article, Pollard
may thereby refocus Bivens analysis on the relationship between federal and state
remedies—as opposed to the recognition of one to the exclusion of the other. See
Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 48.
113. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 561 (contemplating the danger of a “‘too much’
standard”).
114. See Pollard, 132 S. Ct. at 621.
115. 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).

VLADECK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1314

6/14/2012 7:11 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1295

116

and treatment while in custody. Initially, the D.C. Circuit rejected
the plaintiffs’ claims on qualified immunity grounds, holding that
because the detainees had no legally cognizable rights, it necessarily
followed that the defendants’ alleged misconduct could not have
117
been unlawful.
After the Supreme Court held in Boumediene v.
118
Bush that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause “has full effect” at
119
120
Guantánamo, the Court “GVR’d” Rasul for reconsideration in
121
light of that holding. On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed
122
its qualified immunity holding, but added a footnote identifying an
alternative, equally fatal bar to recovery—one borrowed from Judge
123
Janice Rogers Brown’s concurrence in the original panel opinion :
“federal courts cannot fashion a Bivens action when ‘special factors’
counsel against doing so. The danger of obstructing U.S. national
124
security policy is one such factor.” Perhaps because of that cryptic
footnote, the Supreme Court denied certiorari the second time
125
around.
Just over six months after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rasul II, the
en banc Second Circuit reached a similarly themed result in Arar v.

116. See id. at 528. The lead plaintiff in Rasul II was also the lead plaintiff in Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the federal courts have statutory
jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by non-citizens detained at Guantánamo).
117. See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008).
For a more general overview of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence vis-à-vis
Guantánamo—and where Rasul fits in, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After
Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011).
118. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
119. Id. at 771.
120. A “GVR” order is a summary order from the Supreme Court granting
certiorari, vacating the decision below, and remanding for reconsideration in light of
an intervening development—usually a new decision by the Court on a related issue.
See generally Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1996) (describing GVRs and
deciding that issuing such orders is within the Court’s discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction).
121. See 555 U.S. 1083, 1083 (2008).
122. See Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 529–30 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1013 (2009).
123. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 672–73 (D.C. Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring),
vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008).
124. Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 532 n.5. Specifically, the footnote relied on the D.C.
Circuit’s 1985 decision in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
There, then-Judge Scalia had declined to recognize a Bivens claim arising out of the
Iran-Contra affair, arguing that “the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our
hand in the creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy officials
for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing injury abroad.”
Id. at 209. Even Sanchez-Espinoza, though, turned on the fact that the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct took place on foreign soil, and not, as in Rasul, on the
grounds of a U.S. military base over which no other country was sovereign. Id. at
206–07.
125. Rasul v. Myers, 130 S. Ct. 1013, 1013 (2009).
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Ashcroft. Arar, a dual Canadian-Syrian citizen, was arrested by U.S.
authorities at JFK International Airport in September 2002 because
he was (apparently wrongfully) suspected of involvement with al
127
Qaeda. Arar was subsequently detained (and allegedly abused) for
thirteen days before he was subjected to “extraordinary rendition” to
128
Syria, where he remained in custody for just under one year. Arar
subsequently brought a damages suit against the U.S. officers
responsible for his initial detention, his treatment while in U.S.
129
custody, and his subsequent transfer to Syria.
In affirming the district court’s dismissal of Arar’s suit, the en banc
Second Circuit held that his Bivens claims were unavailing because a
130
special factor counseled hesitation—to wit, “rendition.”
As Chief
Judge Jacobs wrote for a 7-4 en banc majority, “in the context of
extraordinary rendition, [a Bivens] action would have the natural
tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security of the
131
nation, and that fact counsels hesitation.”
Noting that
“‘[h]esitation’ is ‘counseled’ whenever thoughtful discretion would
132
pause even to consider,” the Court of Appeals concluded that
damages suits seeking remedies against officials who were
implementing extraordinary rendition policies would impermissibly
entrench the courts in deciding the validity of these important
133
national security policy questions.
Suggesting in addition that the
classified nature of much of the evidence was also a reason to
134
hesitate, the Court of Appeals declined to recognize a Bivens
135
claim.
Unlike Rasul II, the Arar decision provoked a series of dissents.
Judge Sack, in particular, wrote to emphasize the extent to which
“heeding ‘special factors’ relating to secrecy and security is a form of
double counting inasmuch as those interests are fully protected by
136
the state-secrets privilege.” Judge Calabresi agreed, noting that the
137
court already had appropriate methods for protecting secrets.
126. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
127. Id. at 563.
128. Id. at 565–66.
129. See id. at 567 (detailing the complaint that Arar filed against federal officials
for harms resulting from his detention and removal to Syria).
130. Id. at 563.
131. Id. at 574.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 575.
134. Id. at 576.
135. Id. at 580.
136. Id. at 583 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. See id. at 635 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Judge Sack’s
observation that the denial of a Bivens remedy on national security grounds is
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Thus, he suggested that rejecting Bivens suits merely “because state
secrets might be revealed is a bit like denying a criminal trial for fear
that a juror might be intimidated: it allows a risk, that the law is
already at great pains to eliminate, to negate entirely substantial
138
rights and procedures.”
Notwithstanding the force of the doublecounting concern, or the more general point that incorporating casespecific concerns about defenses into analysis of the general
availability of a cause of action dangerously conflates longstanding
139
bodies of precedent, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, with no
140
dissents.
Whereas Rasul II and Arar both involved non-citizen plaintiffs
whose constitutional rights were unclear, at best, the third case in the
141
trilogy is quite the opposite. In Lebron v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the dismissal of a Bivens suit on behalf of Jose Padilla,
a U.S. citizen challenging the legality of his long-term extracriminal
detention within the United States as an “enemy combatant” and his
142
treatment therein.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge
Wilkinson emphasized the “special factors” that, in the court’s view,
counseled hesitation:
First, the Constitution delegates authority over military affairs to
Congress and to the President as Commander in Chief. It
contemplates no comparable role for the judiciary. Second,
judicial review of military decisions would stray from the traditional
subjects of judicial competence. Litigation of the sort proposed
thus risks impingement on explicit constitutional assignments of
143
responsibility to the coordinate branches of our government.

In so holding, Judge Wilkinson provided perhaps the most detailed
analytical underpinnings to the reasoning first deployed in Rasul II
and Arar: the amorphous special factor identified in the two earlier
cases is, in fact, a series of considerations generally reflecting the
constitutional and practical difficulties courts face whenever they are
“double counting of the government’s interest in preserving state secrets”).
138. Id. at 635 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 637 (“These, then, are the
majority’s determinative ‘special factors’: a mix of risks that are amply addressed by
the state secrets doctrine and policy concerns that inhere in all Bivens actions and in
innumerable every-day tort actions as well.”).
139. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 11, at 275–77 (discussing use of various
government defenses to articulate a special factor counseling hesitation).
140. 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). Presumably, because she was on the Second Circuit
throughout most of the en banc proceedings, Justice Sotomayor did not participate.
See id. (noting that Justice Sotomayor did not take part in considering the petition for
certiorari).
141. 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012).
142. Id. at 548.
143. Id.
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asked to review “military affairs,” including the alleged abuse of
144
citizens by the military within the territorial United States. If this is
a “special factor” counseling hesitation against inferring a Bivens
remedy, one is hard-pressed to imagine any challenge to the conduct
of national security policy, whether here or overseas, that could
survive such a test.
Moreover, to whatever extent the courts have identified other
novel special factors in cases less-directly implicating national security
and foreign affairs over the past decade, one can immediately identify
two material differences. First, in the national security context, the
“special factors” analysis seizes on the general inappropriateness of
any judicial interference with governmental action in the relevant
145
arena.
Second, and related, the Bivens decisions in the national
security cases are therefore unlike Wilkie, Pollard, and other lowercourt holdings; in Rasul II, Arar, and Lebron, it really was “Bivens or
146
147
nothing.” Each time, the Court of Appeals chose the latter.
B. Contractor Preemption
Whereas the cases discussed above go to the difficulty in identifying
a cause of action against federal officers for post-September 11 civil
liberties abuses, the same difficulty presumably should not have
hampered attempts to hold government contractors liable in cases in
which they allegedly violated plaintiffs’ rights while acting under
color of federal law. Indeed, as Pollard held in rejecting a Bivens
claim, it is the more normal course to use state—rather than

144. Id. at 548–50.
145. See, e.g., id. at 549 (“Further supporting judicial deference is the
Constitution’s parallel commitment of command responsibility in national security
and military affairs to the President as Commander in Chief.”).
146. See id. at 552–55 (refusing to consider a Bivens claim where interests of other
branches of government would be adversely affected); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559,
580–81 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting a Bivens claim where the court
determined that the merits of the counterterrorism policy at issue should be left to
Congress), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C.
Cir.) (per curiam) (denying a Bivens claim because no liability should be available),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
147. The one exception to this pattern thus far was the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, Nos. 10-1687,
10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011), in which the Court of
Appeals held that a Bivens remedy was available—and that qualified immunity did
not bar—a claim by U.S. citizens arising out of their allegedly unlawful detention and
mistreatment by U.S. agents while they were working for a private Iraqi security firm.
Id. at 594. The Seventh Circuit has since granted the government’s petition for
rehearing en banc, and heard argument on February 8, 2012. SEVENTH CIRCUIT
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=101687&submit=showdkt&yr=10&num=1687 (last visited May 3, 2012).
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federal—law to measure the liability of private contractors.
Nevertheless, when victims of torture at Abu Ghraib brought a civil
suit against the defense contractors allegedly responsible for at least
some of the abuse, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit held in Saleh v.
149
Titan Corp. that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims were barred under a
Boyle-like theory, even though the lawsuit did not implicate a
150
“discretionary function.” Invoking, instead, the distinct “combatant
151
activities” exception to the FTCA, Judge Silberman, writing for the
panel majority, explained that “the [Boyle] court looked to the FTCA
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity [more generally] to
determine that the conflict was significant and to measure the
152
boundaries of the conflict.”
Thus, the Court of Appeals could look to the combatant activities
exception to identify the requisite “conflict” between state tort suits
153
and federal policy.
Relying on a Ninth Circuit decision that held
that “the combatant activities exception was designed ‘to recognize
that during wartime encounters[,] no duty of reasonable care is owed
to those against whom force is directed as a result of authorized
154
military action,’” the D.C. Circuit held that the same should be true
155
for private military contractors. “[I]t is the imposition per se of the
state or foreign tort law that conflicts with the FTCA’s policy of
156
eliminating tort concepts from the battlefield,” Judge Silberman
explained. Thus, the D.C. Circuit articulated the principle of
“battlefield preemption,” i.e., that “the federal government occupies
the field when it comes to warfare, and its interest in combat is always
157
‘precisely contrary’ to the imposition of a non-federal tort duty.”
Judge Garland sharply dissented, identifying two central flaws in
the majority’s analysis. First, as he explained:
Boyle has never been applied to protect a contractor from liability
resulting from the contractor’s violation of federal law and policy.
And there is no dispute that the conduct alleged, if true, violated
both. Hence, these cases are not “within the area where the policy
148. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
149. 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011).
150. Id. at 6.
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006) (exempting from liability “[a]ny claim arising
out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard,
during time of war”).
152. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 6.
153. Id. at 6 & n.3.
154. See id. at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d
1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1992)).
155. Id. at 7–8.
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id. (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 500 (1988)).
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of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated,” and they
present no “significant conflict” with federal interests. Preemption
158
is therefore not justified under Boyle.

Second, and as significantly, Boyle’s analysis centered both textually
and analytically on the FTCA’s discretionary function exception—
and not on the general idea that preemption could be derived from
159
any or all of the FTCA’s statutory exceptions. Otherwise, as Judge
Garland suggested, “there is no reason to stop there. The FTCA’s
exceptions are not limited to discretionary functions and combatant
activities . . . . Once we depart from the limiting principle of Boyle, it
160
is hard to tell where to draw the line.”
Nevertheless, despite the
unusual (and strident) dissent from Judge Garland, along with a
surprisingly equivocal amicus brief from the U.S. government
161
respecting certiorari, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
162
Saleh.
Perhaps emboldened by the denial of certiorari in Saleh, the Fourth
Circuit subsequently relied heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in
throwing out another pair of state-law tort suits also arising out of
163
Abu Ghraib. Thus, after holding in Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc.
that rejection of a Boyle-like defense was subject to an immediate
164
interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine, a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals followed Saleh in Al Shimari v. CACI
165
International, Inc.
After extensively recounting the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis, Judge Niemeyer held that “[t]he uniquely federal interest in
conducting and controlling the conduct of war, including
intelligence-gathering activities within military prisons, thus is simply
166
incompatible with state tort liability in that context.” As if the point
were not sufficiently clear, Judge Niemeyer concluded with the

158. Id. at 23 (Garland, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
159. See id. One might also object that the FTCA exception is not for all military
activities, but rather for “combatant” activities. So construed, it may not even be
clear that, had the same claims been brought under the FTCA against U.S.
servicemembers, the exception would have barred relief.
160. Id.
161. In a brief invited by the Supreme Court, the Obama Administration took
fairly substantial issue with much of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis, but nevertheless
recommended that certiorari be denied given the narrowness of the claims and the
lack of a circuit split. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Saleh v. Titan
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011) (No. 09-1313), 2011 WL 2134985, at *11–13.
162. 131 S. Ct. at 3055.
163. 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc.,
No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
164. Id. at 205.
165. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th
Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
166. Id. at 419–20.
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observation that “[w]hat we hold is that conduct carried out during
war and the effects of that conduct are, for the most part, not
167
properly the subject of judicial evaluation,” and then penned a
separate concurrence suggesting that, even if Saleh was wrongly
168
decided, the political question doctrine would bar recovery.
Judge King, who dissented from the recognition of interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction in Al-Quraishi, dissented on the merits in Al
169
Shimari, largely reprising Judge Garland’s dissent from Saleh.
The
plaintiffs then sought rehearing en banc, this time with the support
170
of the Obama Administration. And on May 11, 2012, the en banc
Fourth Circuit held by an 11–3 vote that the Court of Appeals in fact
lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over the two district court
decisions denying the contractors’ motions to dismiss, remanding to
allow the district court to proceed to discovery and summary
171
judgment on the merits.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals
expressed no view on the merits (including the Boyle preemption
172
question) —and several of the judges in the majority hinted in
concurring opinions that they were sympathetic to the contractors’
173
defenses.
What is telling about both Saleh and the (now vacated) panel
decision in Al Shimari is how dramatically they differ from other
applications of Boyle in the circuit courts, even after September 11.
As with the pre-September 11 jurisprudence surveyed above, other
post-September 11 cases have stuck to the “narrow” understanding of
Boyle—as only applying in cases implicating the “discretionary
function” exception at most, and even then, only comfortably in cases
174
arising out of products liability.
Thus, whereas the Bivens
jurisprudence reveals the recognition of a new kind of “special factor”
against a backdrop in which more and more special factors have been

167. Id. at 420.
168. See id. at 420–25 (Niemeyer, J., concurring separately).
169. Id. at 427–36 (King, J., dissenting).
170. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l,
Inc., Nos. 09-1335, 10-1891, 10-1921 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc), 2012 WL
123570.
171. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773, at *13 (4th Cir.
May 11, 2012) (en banc).
172. See, e.g., id. at *10 n.14.
173. See id. at *13 (Duncan, J., concurring). But see id. at *14 (Wynn, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that the jurisdictional dismissal intimated no opinion
whatsoever on the merits).
174. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 460–61 (5th Cir.
2010) (looking only at whether Boyle’s three conditions are met in the product
liability context).
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175

the Boyle jurisprudence reflects a categorical and
identified,
fundamental expansion of a previously circumscribed doctrinal rule,
grounded in, but hardly confined to, amorphous national security
considerations.
C. The Political Question Doctrine
As Judge Niemeyer’s concurrence in the original panel decision in
176
Al Shimari suggested, the political question doctrine has also
become an increasingly prominent defense in post-September 11
national security cases. And yet, because the political question
doctrine has always fared better in the lower courts than in the
177
Supreme Court, it is more difficult to ascertain whether, in this
context, the uptick in political question cases can be ascribed to
unique national security considerations, or rather as part of a more
general pattern.
Consider in this regard the litigation in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical
178
Industries Co. v. United States. After the U.S. government destroyed a
Sudanese pharmaceutical plant in 1998, the government claimed in
various statements that it had neutralized a potential chemical
179
weapons facility.
The owner of the plant, who maintained his
innocence, brought two separate suits: a takings claim arising out of
the destruction of his property, and an FTCA claim premised on the
180
allegedly defamatory nature of the government’s public statements.
In 2004, the Federal Circuit dismissed the takings claim, relying on
181
the political question doctrine.
Because the “enemy property”
doctrine would bar recovery if the plant was in fact a chemical
182
weapons factory,
the Court of Appeals reasoned that “the
175. See supra Part II.A (exploring the Court’s skepticism toward new Bivens
remedies as demonstrated by its recognition of new “special factors”).
176. See Al Shimari, 658 F.3d at 420–25 (Niemeyer, J., concurring separately)
(applying the Baker factors to the conduct of military contractors in Iraq).
177. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (rejecting the government’s
argument that questions of sovereignty are subject to the political question
doctrine), with El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 842–43
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing suit on political question doctrine grounds
because “[a] plaintiff may not . . . clear the political question bar simply by ‘recasting
foreign policy and national security questions in tort terms’” (quoting Schneider v.
Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2005))), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011), and
Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming application of
political question doctrine to dismiss farmers’ suit requesting that the government
maintain certain favorable market conditions).
178. 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011).
179. Id. at 838.
180. Id. at 839–40.
181. Id. at 839.
182. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir.
2004); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, and Access to the Courts,
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Constitution, in its text and by its structure, commits to the President
the power to make extraterritorial enemy property designations such
183
as the one made regarding the appellants’ Plant.” In other words,
the Constitution committed to the President the unreviewable right
to be wrong in targeting overseas enemy property. The Supreme
184
Court denied certiorari.
As for the defamation claim, the en banc D.C. Circuit took a
somewhat more nuanced approach in 2010, but nevertheless rejected
185
it under the political question doctrine.
As Judge Griffith
explained in writing for the en banc majority, “[t]he political
question doctrine bars our review of claims that, regardless of how
they are styled, call into question the prudence of the political
branches in matters of foreign policy or national security
186
constitutionally committed to their discretion.” Thus,
[t]he case at hand involves the decision to launch a military strike
abroad . . . . The law-of-nations claim asks the court to decide
whether the United States’ attack on the plant was “mistaken and
not justified.” The defamation claim similarly requires us to
determine the factual validity of the government’s stated reasons
for the strike. If the political question doctrine means anything in
the arena of national security and foreign relations, it means the
courts cannot assess the merits of the President’s decision to
launch an attack on a foreign target, and the plaintiffs ask us to do
187
just that.

Like the Federal Circuit, then, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
Constitution contains a textually demonstrable commitment of such
decision-making power to the political branches. And as in the
188
Federal Circuit case, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
But whether such analysis is convincing in the context of U.S.
military operations overseas, lower courts have also relied on the
political question doctrine to bar claims against contractors. For
example, the same day as the panel decided Al-Quraishi and Al
Shimari, the Fourth Circuit relied on the political question doctrine to
throw out a U.S. servicemember’s claim that he was injured due to
189
the negligence of a government contractor.
Writing for a
11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 933 (2007) (providing background on the “enemy
property” doctrine and its application in El-Shifa).
183. El-Shifa, 378 F.3d at 1367.
184. 545 U.S. 1139, 1139 (2005).
185. See El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 838.
186. Id. at 842.
187. Id. at 844.
188. 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011).
189. Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 403 (4th Cir.
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unanimous panel (at least as to the judgment) in Taylor v. Kellogg
190
Brown & Root Services, Inc., Judge King held that such a claim could
not go forward because “an analysis of [the defendant’s] contributory
negligence defense would ‘invariably require the Court to decide
whether . . . the Marines made a reasonable decision’ in seeking to
install the wiring box to add another electric generator at the Tank
Ramp”—without which the plaintiff would not have been injured by
191
the contractor. That is to say, the political question doctrine barred
adjudication of claims against contractors, at least where the
192
contractor was operating under the military’s control and where
“national defense interests were closely intertwined with the military’s
193
decisions governing [the contractor’s] conduct.”
In so holding, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on an earlier
decision by the Eleventh Circuit rejecting an analogous claim against
a government contractor by the wife of a servicemember who was
194
seriously injured in an accident in Iraq caused by an employee. As
the Court of Appeals explained in Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root
195
Services, Inc. :
Because the circumstances under which the accident took place
were so thoroughly pervaded by military judgments and decisions,
it would be impossible to make any determination regarding [the
defendants’] negligence without bringing those essential military
judgments and decisions under searching judicial scrutiny. Yet it is
precisely this kind of scrutiny that the political question doctrine
196
forbids.

To be fair, the decisions in both Taylor and Carmichael went out of
their way carefully to explain why the specific claims at issue would
necessarily bring “military judgments and decisions under searching
197
judicial scrutiny.” Indeed, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded
the dismissal of analogous cases on the ground that it was not clear
198
whether that would inevitably be true.
Thus, these political
question cases turn on remarkably narrow terms—claims against
government contractors arising out of foreign military operations

2011).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 411–12.
192. See id. at 411 (assessing the extent to which the government contractor was
under the military’s control).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 410.
195. 572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010).
196. Id. at 1282–83.
197. Id. at 1283.
198. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 565 (5th Cir. 2008).
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that necessarily implicate particular military decisions.
At the same time, it is difficult to identify a Supreme Court decision
endorsing the underlying principle that the political question
doctrine categorically precludes judicial second-guessing of sensitive
military judgments and decisions, either directly or insofar as they
affect the conduct of military contractors. To the contrary, legion are
decisions emphasizing that not all cases involving the military are
barred by the political question doctrine. Therefore, even if the
reasoning of these political question decisions is specific and their
application limited, they still reflect a fundamental misconception of
199
the underlying principles.
Perhaps El-Shifa came closest to a
convincing explanation—that the concern is with judicial
200
interference with the actual conduct of military operations overseas.
But if that is the review that the political question doctrine forbids,
the Taylor and Carmichael courts appear to have skipped a few steps by
failing to explain in detail how specific combat decisions would
necessarily be called into question simply by allowing civil litigation to
go forward.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that similar carelessness concerning
the political question doctrine can be found in non-national security
decisions by post-September 11 circuit courts, as well. In Zivotofsky v.
201
Secretary of State, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit threw out a
lawsuit in which U.S. citizen parents sought to enforce their statutory
right to have the passport of their child born in Jerusalem read
“Jerusalem, Israel.” Because the statute conflicts with executive
branch policy, which does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of
202
Israel, the State Department refused to comply.
The parents
promptly sued, only to have their claims thrown out. Writing for the
panel majority in the D.C. Circuit, Judge Griffith held that the
parents’ claims were foreclosed by the political question doctrine
because the President’s “recognition” power was exclusive, and
203
therefore unreviewable.
Concurring in the judgment, Judge
Edwards agreed that the President’s recognition power was exclusive,
199. See, e.g., id. at 562 (determining that the political question doctrine did not
bar suit against a government contractor, despite its military affiliations, because the
plaintiffs pled a plausible set of facts regarding fraud and misrepresentation that
would not require the court to question the Army’s role).
200. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (articulating concerns about the judicial branch second-guessing
the strategic decision to deploy troops), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 997 (2011).
201. 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
202. See id. at 1228–30 (explaining why the political question doctrine extended to
the Executive’s power to recognize foreign governments).
203. Id. at 1231–32.
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but concluded that, as a result, the statute in question was necessarily
204
unconstitutional—not that the courts lacked the power to say so.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Edwards,
ruling 8-1 that the political question doctrine did not bar the
205
Zivotofsky’s claim.
As Chief Justice Roberts explained for the
majority, “determining the constitutionality of § 214(d) involves
deciding whether the statute impermissibly intrudes upon
Presidential powers under the Constitution. . . . Either way [that
question is answered], the political question doctrine is not
206
In an important and incisive concurrence, Justice
implicated.”
Sotomayor agreed, elaborating that “it is not whether the evidence
upon which litigants rely is common to judicial consideration that
determines whether a case lacks judicially discoverable and
manageable standards. Rather, it is whether that evidence in fact
provides a court a basis to adjudicate meaningfully the issue with
207
which it is presented. The answer will almost always be yes . . . .”
Other examples of lower courts overzealously applying the political
question doctrine after September 11 abound. But because they run
208
the gamut, it is difficult to draw conclusions from them other than
that, as was true before September 11, the lower courts seem far more
positively disposed toward the political question doctrine than the
Supreme Court. To that end, one might dismiss the newfound uses
of the doctrine in national security cases as further examples of the
deeper underlying trend. Yet, the increasingly uncritical view that
claims implicating almost any military judgments thereby trigger the
political question doctrine may suggest that, as with the Bivens and
contractor preemption cases noted above, these decisions constitute a
new, though modest, departure from extant precedent.
D. Qualified Immunity
I have saved the most voluminous body of law for last. Even
assuming the existence of a cause of action and the lack of
categorical defenses to recovery in civil suits arising out of
204. See id. at 1233–45 (Edwards, J., concurring) (establishing that the political
question doctrine was inapplicable given the “commonplace” issues of statutory
construction).
205. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
206. Id. at 1428.
207. Id. at 1435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
208. See, e.g., Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938 (5th
Cir.) (dismissing a class action brought by gasoline retailers alleging that national oil
production companies were engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy on ground that
claims were barred by political question doctrine), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 366 (2011).
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counterterrorism or other national security policies, a plaintiff must
still demonstrate not just that his rights were violated, but that the
unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct should have been apparent
209
in light of clearly established law. As noted above, this was the D.C.
210
Circuit’s basis for rejecting liability in Rasul I, and one of its two
211
212
In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the one
bases for doing so in Rasul II.
damages suit challenging post-September 11 counterterrorism
policies in which the Supreme Court has reached the merits,
213
qualified immunity was the ultimate ground for denying review. In
light of the novelty of the threat the country has faced and the
policies the government has undertaken to face that threat, it can
hardly be surprising that a defense that forecloses liability in cases
where the law was unsettled has played a particularly central role in
post-September 11 litigation.
Still, two developments in qualified immunity jurisprudence bear
mention. First, in a case having nothing to do with national security,
214
the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan unanimously disposed of
the Saucier sequence in light of practical, procedural, and substantive
215
concerns raised by lower court judges. As Justice Alito wrote for the
Court:
[W]hile the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should
no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district
courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise
their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
216
circumstances in the particular case at hand.

Although the Court still stressed that the Saucier sequence “is often
217
beneficial,” such reasoning presupposes that lower courts will waste
their time reaching holdings that are (1) constitutionally grounded
and (2) no longer necessary to the result. Not surprisingly, such
opinions have been few and far between since Pearson.
As a result, because qualified immunity will preclude recovery in

209. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (explaining that it is not
enough that an action has previously been held to be unlawful; rather, the
unlawfulness must be apparent).
210. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
212. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
213. See id. at 2083–85 (discussing Ashcroft’s qualified immunity from a potential
Fourth Amendment violation).
214. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
215. Id. at 234–35.
216. Id. at 236.
217. Id.
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cases raising novel challenges to governmental counterterrorism
policies (whether because the policy is novel or because the plaintiff’s
legal claim is), the practical effect of Pearson is that such novelty will
seldom be disturbed. For example, suppose a plaintiff challenged a
novel governmental policy as applied to him at T0. At T1, the relevant
court decides that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity
because the unlawfulness of his conduct was not apparent in light of
clearly established law. Under Saucier, that holding would come
alongside judicial articulation of the relevant law going forward
(including perhaps a holding that the policy is unlawful). Under
Pearson it likely will not. If a different plaintiff is now subjected to the
same treatment at T2, qualified immunity will again bar recovery at T3.
In contrast, if the court at T1 had articulated a forward-looking rule as
Saucier required, then the law would have been clearly established at
218
T2 such that the plaintiff should now be able to recover at T3.
A good example of this problem in practice is Jose Padilla’s Bivens
suit against John Yoo, alleging that the opinions Yoo wrote while
serving in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel directly
contributed to Padilla’s mistreatment while in military custody. In
May 2012, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Padilla’s suit based on its
219
conclusion that Yoo was entitled to qualified immunity.
In
particular, the Ninth Circuit so held because (1) it was not clearly
established from 2001 to 2003 that “cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment” (CIDT) shocks the conscience; and (2) it was similarly not
clearly established during the same time period whether the specific
mistreatment Padilla alleged was torture (which did clearly shock the
conscience) or CIDT. And yet, despite its detailed analysis of the
state of the law from 2001 to 2003, and its apparent recognition of
how close a case Padilla’s was, the panel pretermitted its analysis after
holding that the relevant law was not clearly established between 2001
and 2003, expressly invoking Pearson as justifying its decision to set no
220
precedent going forward about the state of the law today.
Of course, this problem is hardly confined to national security
221
As the Padilla litigation demonstrates, however, what
cases.
218. For more on this problem, see Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the
Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595
(2009) (articulating how Saucier could be utilized in post-conviction habeas corpus
cases).
219. Padilla v. Yoo, No. 09-16478, 2012 WL 1526156 (9th Cir. May 2, 2012).
220. Id. at *15 n.16 (“We have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of
qualified immunity analysis to address first. Here, we consider only the second
prong.” (citation omitted)).
221. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating he “would end the failed
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separates national security litigation in this context is the absence of
other opportunities for the articulation of forward-looking
constitutional principles. Whereas ordinary First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendment claims can arise in a number of contexts other
than suits for retrospective relief (e.g., in suits for prospective relief
or as defenses to criminal prosecutions), there are a vanishingly small
set of challenges to national security policies that will be justiciable in
222
those contexts.
Thus, the general rule articulated in Pearson will
wreak particular havoc in the national security context, potentially
freezing (or, at a minimum, substantially slowing) the development
of constitutional law with regard to the surveillance, detention, and
223
treatment of terrorism suspects.
The second development is less about the order of battle than the
substance of qualified immunity analysis. Although courts have
historically applied qualified immunity with relative evenhandedness
to government officers at all levels of service, a provocative
concurrence by Justice Kennedy in the al-Kidd case suggests that this
224
might perhaps be incorrect in national security litigation.
As he
there explained:
A national officeholder intent on retaining qualified immunity
need not abide by the most stringent standard adopted anywhere
in the United States . . . [or] guess at when a relatively small set of
appellate precedents have established a binding legal rule. If
national officeholders were subject to personal liability whenever
they confronted disagreement among appellate courts, those
officers would be deterred from full use of their legal authority.
The consequences of that deterrence must counsel caution by the
Judicial Branch, particularly in the area of national security . . . .
[N]ationwide security operations should not have to grind to a halt
even when an appellate court finds those operations
unconstitutional. The doctrine of qualified immunity does not so
constrain national officeholders entrusted with urgent
225
responsibilities.

To be sure, Justice Kennedy was writing only for himself in this
passage. Still, if this is more than just a fleeting observation, it might
suggest that unique national security concerns do play (and perhaps
Saucier experiment now” in a high school freedom of speech case).
222. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2011)
(suggesting that the very purposes of tort law conflict with the pursuit of warfare),
vacated, No. 10-1891, 2012 WL 1656773 (4th Cir. May 11, 2012) (en banc).
223. See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 275–78.
224. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086–87 (2011) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
225. Id. at 2087 (citations omitted).
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have been playing) a role in judicial assessment of qualified
immunity. At a minimum, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggests
that at least some jurists are far more willing to find no liability in
national security cases than they would in non-national security cases
raising comparable constitutional claims. Unless such holdings were
based on the conclusion that the substantive law was different in the
national security context, it would be hard to see how they could be
consistent with the broader understanding of immunity doctrine.
CONCLUSION: TAKING STOCK OF THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY
CANON
Whatever its full contours, the above analysis has hopefully been
persuasive as to the existence of a new national security canon—a
body of jurisprudence in which distinct (and sometimes poorly
articulated) national security concerns have prompted courts to
disfavor relief, even when either: (1) relief should otherwise have
been available; or (2) other settled (and topically neutral) doctrines
would likely have foreclosed relief in any event. Thus, where federal
officer defendants are concerned, courts have relied heavily on the
absence of Bivens remedies, with qualified immunity as an available
fallback. And where the defendants are private contractors operating
under color of federal law, the Bivens cases have focused on the
availability of state-law remedies, whereas the state-law tort cases have
focused on the unique federal interest justifying preemption.
Ultimately, given the heads-we-win, tails-you-lose quality to this body
of decision-making, it is difficult to rebut the conclusion that, at least
at the circuit level, more is going on than just faithful application of
existing precedent. The question then becomes what to make of this
development.
In the short-term, this jurisprudential pattern suggests that victims
of governmental overreaching in the conduct of national security
policy will primarily have to turn to the political branches for redress,
since retrospective judicial remedies will likely be unavailing. Such a
development might put only that much more pressure on the
growing body of scholarship suggesting that, especially during
national security crises, meaningful checks and balances can be
found internally within the Executive Branch. As significantly, such
case law might eventually force the Supreme Court to reassert its role
in these cases in a manner that gives these newfound doctrinal
accommodations a far narrower compass than they might otherwise
enjoy. Indeed, given that most of the case law identified in Part II
arises out of a minority of jurisdictions (the Second, Fourth,
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Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), one response might be that these
circuits are merely outliers whose extreme views have distorted the
state of play.
But if what in fact has taken place over the last decade is a
testament to a longer-term pattern, one that neither the political
branches nor the Supreme Court disrupt in the near future, then we
must confront a more alarming possibility: that as these “national
security”-based exceptions increasingly become the rule in
contemporary civil litigation against government officers—whether
with regard to new “special factors” under Bivens, new bases for
contractor preemption under Boyle, proliferation of the political
question doctrine, or even more expansive reliance upon the
qualified immunity defense—the line between the unique national
security justifications giving rise to these cases and ordinary civil
litigation will increasingly blur. Thus, wherever one comes down on
the virtues and vices of this new national security canon, perhaps the
most important point to take away is the need to carefully cabin its
scope. Otherwise, exceptions articulated in the guise of such unique
fact patterns could serve more generally to prevent civil liability for
government misconduct and to thereby dilute the effectiveness of
judicial review as a deterrent for any and all unlawful government
action—not just those actions undertaken in ostensibly in defense of
the nation.

